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MAKING A REAL DIFFERENCE: THE DOMINANCE APPROACH
IN THE OPINIONS OF JUSTICE BERYL J. LEVINE
KATHRYN R. L. RAND*
"[W]e who work with law need to be about the business of articu-
lating the theory of women's practice-women's resistance, visions,
consciousness, injuries, notions of community, experience of
inequality."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Catharine MacKinnon has been called "the most prominent and
persistent advocate" for a strand of feminist theory which describes sex
inequality in terms of women's social subordination. 2 This strand,
termed the "dominance approach," recognizes and challenges a perva-
sive system of gender hierarchy. It is a more sophisticated way of
thinking about sex inequality, in that it critically examines, rather than
seeks to obtain, the status quo.
Justice Beryl Levine, the first woman to sit on the North Dakota
Supreme Court, has adopted in part the dominance approach, as evi-
denced particularly by her opinions involving child custody and spousal
support. In this way, Justice Levine sits apart from her colleagues, not
because of her gender, but because of her awareness that women's
inequality is not theoretical or abstract, but rather real and concrete.
Justice Levine's acknowledgment of women's reality outside the court-
room benefits not only the woman named in a particular case caption,
but all women. Her willingness to state women's reality in the face of
the law's dogged attachment to ostensible gender-neutral principles
serves both to educate North Dakota policy makers and to build a more
sophisticated jurisprudence of sex equality.
This essay sets out the dominance approach as described in
MacKinnon's work, and then identifies the dominance approach in
Justice Levine's opinions. Justice Levine may or may not have been
influenced by MacKinnon's work; my purpose is not to contend that she
has so been. Instead, my implicit argument is to advocate a theory of
* Law Clerk to Chief Judge J.P. Stadtmueller, United States District Court, Eastern District of
Wisconsin. B.A., University of North Dakota, 1990; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1993.
The author served as law clerk to Justice Beryl J. Levine from 1993-1994.
I. Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 14 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Practice to Theory].
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REv. 826, 829 (1988) (reviewing
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODEREo (1987)).
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sex equality which takes into account women's socially constructed
inequality. This, I suggest, is exactly what Justice Levine has done.
II. THE DOMINANCE APPROACH
The dominance approach to sex equality is best understood as
contrasted to the difference approach. The difference approach, simpli-
fied, argues that women should be permitted to compete with men on
equal terms in the public world. It attacks gender-based distinctions as
arising out of inaccurate female stereotypes and thus perpetuating
women's social subordination. 3  Legal doctrine has embraced the
difference approach as the touchstone of sex equality theory, 4 exempl-
ified by the Constitution's similarly situated requirement and summa-
rized in Aristotle's axiom that equality is treating likes alike and unlikes
unalike .5
The difference approach endorses gender neutrality, insisting that
women are, and thus should be treated, the same as men.6 It was a legal
attempt to advance women, but fell short of addressing the roots of sex
inequality: "The point was to apply existing law to women as if women
were citizens-as if the doctrine was not gendered to women's disadvan-
tage, as if the legal system had no sex, as if women were gender-neutral
persons temporarily trapped by law in female bodies." 7 Thus, the,
difference approach, because it is based on formal equality and
sex-blindness, fails to recognize the existing structural inequalities of the
sexes. "Equality, in this approach, merely had to be applied to women
to be attained. Inequality consisted in not applying it. The content of
the concept of equality itself was never questioned." 8 Overlooked by
3. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977) ("[G]ender-based differenti-
ation ... is forbidden by the Constitution, at least when supported by no more substantial justification
than 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations or 'old notions,' such as 'assumptions as to depend-
ency,' that are more consistent with 'the role-typing society has long imposed,' than with contemp-
orary reality.") (citations omitted); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) ("[S]tatutory
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of
females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.").
5. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 3, 1131a, 1131b (Irwin trans. 1985).
6. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 33-34 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED] ("[Tihe difference approach ... is obsessed with the sex difference. The main
theme in the fugue is 'we're the same, we're the same, we're the same.' The counterpoint theme (in
a higher register) is 'but we're different, but we're different, but we're different."'). Incidentally,
the title, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, comes from MacKinnon's distinction between liberal feminism and
socialist feminism on one hand, and radical feminism on the other: "[Jiust as socialist feminism has
often amounted to marxism applied to women, liberal feminism has often amounted to liberalism
applied to women. Radical feminism is feminism." That is, feminism without a modifier. Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 635, 639 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence].
7. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1286
(1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections].
8. Id.
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the difference approach is how difference is created and defined by
white male norms, standards, and institutions: "Why should anyone
have to be like white men to get what they have, given that white men do
not have to be like anyone except each other to have it?"9
MacKinnon's work builds from these criticisms of the difference
approach and the idea that gender is a socially constructed hierarchy (in
which women are subordinate to men) rather than mere difference.
"Gender, elaborated and sustained by behavioral patterns of application
and administration, is maintained as a division of power." 10 Predating
and precipitating forms of government, the gender hierarchy is both
perpetuated and codified by government. "[T]he state, in part through
law, institutionalizes male power. If male power is systemic, it is the
regime."l I This understanding of gender inequality emphasizes that
women are subordinate to men because of their status as women, that
existing inequality is not an accident wherein a particular individual
missed anointment by the Aristotlean ideal.12
Given that women are not situated similarly to men, but rather
are socially unequal, looking at women one at a time rather
than as women ensures that it is only the exceptional woman
who escapes gender inequality enough to be able to claim she
is injured by it. It seems that we already have to be equal
before we can complain of inequality. 13
MacKinnon argues that by emphasizing difference (and ignoring
the fact that men are as different from women as women are from men),
the difference approach operates to maintain the gender hierarchy.
[C]onstruing gender as a difference, termed simply the gender
difference, obscures and legitimizes the way gender is imposed
9. Id. at 1287.
10. MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 6, at 644.
11. Id. at 645.
12. MacKinnon criticizes the world view to which the difference approach subscribes and
perpetuates:
There is a belief that this is a society in which women and men are basically equals[,...
[that] [tihis is a world in which it is worth trying. In this world of presumptive equality,
people make money based on their training or abilities or diligence or qualifications.
They are employed and advanced on the basis of merit. In this world of just deserts, if
someone is abused, it is thought to violate the basic rules of the community. If it doesn't,
that person is seen to have done something she could have chosen to do differently, by
exercise of will or better judgment. Maybe such people have placed themselves in a
situation of vulnerability to physical abuse. Maybe they have done something provoca-
tive. Or maybe they were just unusually unlucky.... The law ... operates largely within
the realm of these beliefs.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 10-11
(1985) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornography]. Feminism, as defined by MacKinnon, "is the
discovery that women do not live in this world." Id.
13. MACKINNON, FEMtNIsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6. at 74.
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by force. It hides that force behind a static description of
gender as a biological or social or mythic or semantic partition,
engraved or inscribed or inculcated by god, nature, society
(agents unspecified), the unconscious, or the cosmos. The idea
of gender difference helps keep the reality of male dominance
in place.14
Thus, under the difference approach, the likelihood of obtaining
equality is lessened because its very doctrine ignores the existing social
inequality of women:
If gender were merely a question of difference, sex inequality
would be a problem of mere sexism, of mistaken differentia-
tion, of inaccurate categorization of individuals. This is what
the difference approach thinks it is and is therefore sensitive to.
But if gender is an inequality first, constructed as a socially
relevant differentiation in order to keep that inequality in place,
then sex inequality questions are questions of systematic domi-
nance, of male supremacy, which is not at all abstract and is
anything but a mistake. 15
Neutral principles, then, so fundamental to the difference approach
and so attractive to legal doctrine, are the ultimate failure of the differ-
ence approach. "If the law then looks neutrally on the reality of gender
so produced, the harm that has been done will not be perceptible as
harm. It becomes just the way things are." 16 In the same way, by not
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 42. In the legal system, the failure of the difference approach catches women in a
double bind: "[Slociety advantages [men] before they get into court, and law is prohibited from taking
that preference into account because that would mean taking gender into account." Id. at 35.
Manifestations of the difference approach ask the wrong questions and thus address the wrong
problems. For example,
Attempts to reform and enforce rape laws . .. have tended to build on the model of the
deviant perpetrator and the violent act, as if the fact that rape is a crime means that the
society is against it. so law enforcement would reduce or delegitimize it. Initiatives are
accordingly directed toward making the police more sensitive, prosecutors more
responsive, judges more receptive, and the law, in words, less sexist. This may be
progressive in the liberal or the left senses, but how is it empowering in the feminist
sense? Even if it were effective in jailing men who do little different from what
nondeviant men do regularly, how would such an approach alter women's rapability?
Unconfronted are why women are raped and the role of the state in that.
MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 6, at 643.
16. MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 12, at 7-8. By way of illustration, MacKinnon
classifies the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as "neutral toward racism," while the
Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown
II), "recognized its substantivity, therefore its inequality." Id. at 6. In the same way, current sex
equality doctrine, because it is based on neutral principles, works to preserve the status quo because it
recognizes no inequality, and therefore no harm, in the status quo. The dominance approach, on the
other hand, recognizes the inequality inherent in the gender hierarchy. Like Brown's groundbreaking
recognition that separate is not equal, the dominance approach recognizes that with regard to gender,
similarly situated is a farce.
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questioning the accepted standard, the difference approach endorses
man as the stick (so to speak) against which woman is measured: 17 "As
male is the implicit reference for human, maleness will be the measure of
equality in sex discrimination law."18
In contrast to the difference approach, MacKinnon sees her brand
of feminism as "a theory of how the erotization of dominance and
submission creates gender, creates woman and man in the social form in
which we know them." 19 Thus, the dominance approach identifies the
problem as not that the sexes have been treated differently, but that one
group (men) has dominated the other (women). This, the recognition
that men and women occupy unequal positions of power in society, is
the fundamental underpinning of the dominance approach.2 0
If sex inequalities are approached as matters of imposed status,
which are in need of change if a legal mandate of equality
means anything at all, the question whether women should be
treated unequally means simply whether women should be
treated as less. When it is exposed as a naked power question,
there is no separable question of what ought to be. The only
real question is what is and is not a gender question. Once no
amount of difference justifies treating women as subhuman,
eliminating that is what equality law is for.21
17. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 43 ("Simply by treating the status quo as
'the standard,' [the difference approach] invisibly and uncritically accepts the arrangements under
male supremacy.").
18. MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence. supra note 6, at 644.
19. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 50. Implicit in this definition is another
fundamental tenet of the dominance approach, that is, the role of sexuality as power in creating and
perpetuating the gender hierarchy: "Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as
we know them, by the social requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual
dominance and female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of gender inequality."
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS:
J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 515, 533 (1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Agenda] (footnote omitted).
MacKinnon provides a provocative shorthand for the role of sexuality in the gender hierarchy:
"some fuck and others get fucked." Id. at 517.
20. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6. at 50. MacKinnon explains,
If inequality is concrete, no man is ever in the same position a woman is, because he is
not in it as a woman. That does not mean a man cannot be recognized as discriminated
against on the basis of sex. It does mean that it is no measure of virtue for an equality
theory to accord the 'same solicitude to dominant groups as to subordinate ones, all the
while ignoring who is who. If the point of equality law is to end group-based dominance
and subordination, rather than to recognize sameness or accommodate difference, a
greater priority is placed on rectifying the legal inequality of groups that are historically
unequal in society, and less solicitude is accorded pure legal artifacts or reversals of
social fortune.
MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 7, at 1324-25.
21. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 43.
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Unlike the difference approach, the dominance approach is critical
of "reality": 22 "The difference approach tries to map reality; the
dominance approach tries to challenge and change it."23
That reality is male dominance. 24  Male dominance first sets the
standards by which one succeeds (or just survives) in society:
Men's physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto
and health insurance coverage, their socially designed biogra-
phies define workplace expectations and successful career
patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in
scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their
objectification of life defines art, their military service defines
citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get
along with each other-their wars and rulerships-defines
history, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex.
25
So where do women fit in this male-defined society? By definition,
in a position subordinate to men. That subordination leads to apparently
guilt-free abuses: "[W]omen's situation combines unequal pay with allo-
cation to disrespected work, sexual targeting for rape, domestic battering,
sexual abuse as children, and systematic sexual harassment; deperson-
alization, demeaned physical characteristics, use in denigrating entertain-
ment, deprivation of reproductive control, and forced prostitution." 26
What the difference approach elides is who's on top, in more ways than
one.
To see that these practices are done by men to women is to see
these abuses as forming a system, a hierarchy of inequality.
This situation has occurred in many places, in one form or
another, for a Very long time, often in a context characterized
22. Id. at 40. I use MacKinnon's term "reality" as a shorthand for the obviously varied
circumstances-the realities-women experience. I do not mean to imply that all women's situations
are identical. For an argument that feminist theory fails to take account of race and class, see, for
example, ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
114 (1988). MacKinnon has specifically addressed Spelman's criticisms. See MacKinnon, Practice
to Theory, supra note 1, at 15.
23. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 44. The difference approach fails to
recognize that "male power produces the world before it distorts it." MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note
19, at 542.
24. As MacKinnon explains,
[Miale dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious system of power in
history [and] ... is metaphysically nearly perfect. Its point of view is the standard for
point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the meaning of universality. Its force is exercised
as consent, its authority as participation, its supremacy as the paradigm of order, its
control as the definition of legitimacy.
MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 6, at 638-39. Implicit in MacKinnon's description of
male dominance are the standards of whiteness and heterosexuality as additional contributing factors.
25. MACKtNNON, FEMwnsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 36.
26. MacKinnon, Practice to Theory, supra note 1, at 15.
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by disenfranchisement, preclusion from property ownership
(women are more likely to be property than to own any), own-
ership and use as object, exclusion from public life, sex- based
poverty, degraded sexuality, and a devaluation of women's
human worth and contributions throughout society. 27
The combination of male norms and female subordination creates a
self-perpetuating and self-affirming loop: When women do not meet
male standards, their "difference" becomes a justification for their
exclusion or inferior position. 28 Their inferior position serves as a
justification for their abuse at the hands of men. The reality created by
the abuse of women makes their "difference" all the more real.
This subordination of women to men is socially institution-
alized, cumulatively and systematically shaping access to
human dignity, respect, resources, physical security, credibility,
membership in community, speech, and power. Comprised of
all its variations, the group women can be seen to have a collec-
tive social history of disempowerment, exploitation and subordi-
nation extending to the present. To be treated "as a woman"
in this sense is to be disadvantaged in these ways incident to
being socially assigned to the female sex. To speak of social
treatment "as a woman" is thus not to invoke any abstract
essence or homogenous generic or ideal type, not to posit any-
thing, far less a universal anything, but to refer to this diverse
and pervasive concrete material reality of social meanings and
practices such that, in the words of Richard Rorty, "a woman is
not yet the name of a way of being human ...."29
The response of the difference approach to the dominance ap-
proach's revelation that harms happen to women because they are
women, is that they happen to men, too. "If women are raped, men are
raped. If women are sexually harassed, men are sexually harassed. If
women are battered, men are battered. Symmetry must be reasserted.
Neutrality must be reclaimed. Equality must be reestablished" 30 By
forcing the reality of women's subordination into neutral terms, the
difference approach makes the inequality invisible, makes the harms to
27. Id.
28. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 34. Thus, "neutral" principles-really the
standards of a man-made hierarchy-are stacked against women and operate to keep them in their
place. "Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the
female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both." Id.
29. MacKinnon, Practice to Theory, supra note 1, at 15-16 (quoting Richard Rorty, Feminism and
Pragmatism, 20 MICH. Q. REv. 231,234 (1991)).
30. MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 12, at 14-15.
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women individual rather than systematic, makes it our fault. 31 Individu-
alizing the harm of inequality, though disbelieving of women's
experience as well as distrusting of their intelligence, capability, and
credibility, 32 fails to disprove the validity of the dominance approach.
[T]o show that an observation or experience is not the same for
all women proves only that it is not biological, not that it is not
gendered. Similarly, to say that not only women experience
something-for example, to suggest that because some men are
raped rape is not an act of male dominance-only suggests that
the status of women is not biological. Men can be feminized
too, and they know they are when they are raped. 33
As MacKinnon continually reminds her audience, neither inequality
nor its harms are apportioned neutrally:
Men are not paid half of what women are paid for doing the
same work on the basis of their equal difference. Everything
they touch does not turn valueless because they touched it.
When they are hit, a person has been assaulted. When they are
sexually violated, it is not simply tolerated or found enter-
taining or defended as the necessary structure of the family, the
price of civilization, or a constitutional right.34
Difference, then, and the justified (and unjustified) classifications
which follow it, are part of male dominance, particularly as it is
expressed in the law. When gender is seen as a result of dominance
rather than a manifestation of difference, "gender changes from a
31. This is exemplified through the law of sexual harassment (ironically, because MacKinnon
spearheaded the idea that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination in her watershed work
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979)), which indicates that if the complained-of conduct is
welcome, it cannot constitute harassment. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484. 486-87 (7th Cir.
1991). This facet of sex discrimination law leaves open the possibility that some women (or, more
accurately, some people) enjoy being harassed. Thus, those women who complain about it may be
overly sensitive to what otherwise is red-blooded American male fun. See, e.g., id. at 486-87, 492-93
(upholding trial court's finding that plaintiff "was a willing and welcome participant" in such conduct
as being "handcuffed to the drunk tank," "physically hit and punched in the kidneys," having her head
"forcefully placed in members['] laps," having "a cattle prod with an electrical shock placed between
her legs," being "handcuffed to the toilet and [having] her face pushed into the water," and being
"maced"). More recently, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the notion that "unladylike" behavior
excuses (or perhaps more to the core of the welcomeness doctrine, deserves) what otherwise, had the
plaintiff behaved more delicately, would be considered unlawful sexual harassment. See Carr v.
Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1994). In a small step toward recognizing
women's position in the gender hierarchy, the court in Carr hinted that the workplace reality that
men's and women's similar behavior does not carry identical implications might serve as a guiding
principle: "The asymmetry of the positions must be considered. She was one woman; they were many
men. Her use of terms like 'fuck head' could not be deeply threatening, or her placing a hand on the
thigh of one of her macho coworkers intimidating ...." Id. at 1011.
32. See MAcKINNON, FEamsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 58 ("It is our reality, even before our
knowledge, that is in doubt.").
33. Id. at 56.
34. Id. at 41.
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distinction that is presumptively valid to a detriment that is presumptively
suspect." 35 The dominance approach refuses to abide by the reality of
women's social inequality, 36 seeking instead to challenge and change it.
So what of the dominance approach and the law? As with any
nascent legal doctrine, it is not cleanly substituted for its predecessor.
"Practical considerations . .. suggest that substantial work will be
necessary to apply the dominance approach in particular contexts.
Whatever the precise meaning of the approach, however, it is clear that its
application would move the law further in the direction of gender
equality." 37 Justice Levine, as the next section illustrates, has worked to
move North Dakota's law closer to gender equality through her applica-
tion of the dominance approach, particularly in the areas of child
custody and spousal support.
III. THE DOMINANCE APPROACH AS PRESENT IN JUSTICE
LEVINE'S OPINIONS
The intersection of divorce law and gender inequality is crucial, 38
and represents a particular failure of the difference approach. The few
rules of law which benefited women, such as the tender-years doctrine 39
and the traditional concept of alimony,40 broke down under a gender-
neutral approach.
Under the rule of gender neutrality, the law of custody and
divorce has been transformed, giving men an equal chance at
custody of children and at alimony. Men often look like better
"parents" under gender-neutral rules like level of income and
35. Id. at 44.
36. See id. at 39 ("For women to affirm difference, when difference means dominance, as it
does with gender, means to affirm the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness.").
37. Sunstein, supra note 2. at 838.
38. Women have been both relegated to and abused in the home, largely as a consequence of
marriage and motherhood. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, " The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Preroga-
tive and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). For a discussion of the "dominant family ecology," see
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236-48
(1994) (describing "the gendered structure of wage labor, a gendered sense of the extent to which
child care can be delegated, and gender pressures on men to structure their identities around work").
39. The tender-years doctrine is an "evidentiary presumption[] in favor of mothers in custody
disputes involving young children, children of 'tender years."' David L. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 515 (1984).
40. That is, wives, rather than gender-neutral disadvantaged spouses, were awarded alimony
under traditional concepts of marriage. See generally Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989). MacKinnon notes, however, that the contract concept of marriage is unequally
enforced:
To those of you who think that marriage is an equal bargain, I would suggest, just to
begin with, that in any place where one cannot prosecute for marital rape, the woman's
obligation to sexually deliver is effectively enforced by the state. The support obligation
that men supposedly provide overwhelmingly is not.
MACKINNON, FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED. supra note 6, at 76.
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presence of nuclear family, because men make more money
and (as they say) initiate the building of family units.4 1
Here, as generally, treating a woman as an individual free of any
social barriers, rather than recognizing women's social subordination as
a group, compounds rather than addresses gender inequality.
The group realities that make women more in need of alimony
are not permitted to matter, because only individual factors,
gender-neutrally considered, may matter. So the fact that
women will live their lives, as individuals, as members of the
group women, with women's chances in a sex-discriminatory
society, may not count, or else it is sex discrimination. 42
Divorce law, perhaps in particular, is positioned to address several of
the circumstances which make up women's reality:
To be poor, financially dependent, and a primary parent con-
stitutes part of what being a woman means. Most of those who
are in those circumstances are women. A gender-neutral ap-
proach to those circumstances obscures . . . the fact that
women's poverty, financial dependency, motherhood, and sex-
ual accessibility . . . substantively make up women's status as
women. It describes what it is to be most women. That some
men find themselves in a similar situation doesn't mean that
they occupy that status as men, as members of their gender.
They do so as exceptions, both in norms and numbers. 43
The recognition of this reality, and the willingness to posture gender
neutrality as political rather than moral,44 are the foundation of the
dominance approach.
Justice Levine's opinions in the areas of child custody and spousal
support, though generally carefully couched in gender-neutral terms,
evidence a pointed accounting of the reality of women's situations. 45
41. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 35 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 73. For a discussion of the intersection of gender and race with regard to alimony, see
Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. LJ.
2481 (1994).
44. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 44 ("In the dominance approach, sex
discrimination stops being a question of morality and starts being a question of politics.").
45. These are not, however, the only areas in which Justice Levine has refused to turn a blind
eye to the world outside of the courtroom. In a sexual harassment case, Justice Levine offered the
opinion that sex discrimination "goes beyond all bounds of decency and is truly atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 188
(N.D. 1993) (Levine, J., concurring). She has noted the historical roots of women's subordination, and
the resultant denial of power, on several occasions. E.g., id. at 189 ("The exclusion of women [from
the practice of law] rested on the belief that men, simply because they were men, belonged in the
public sphere rife with power and status, and women, in the private sphere-the home."); City of
Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 746 (N.D. 1993) ("Gender-based peremptory challenges are a bad
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She has championed, without success, 46 the "primary caretaker" rule,
which states (as announced by the Minnesota Supreme Court) "that
when both parents seek custody of a child too young to express a
preference, and one parent has been the primary caretaker of the child,
custody should be awarded to the primary caretaker absent a showing
that that parent is unfit to be the custodian." 47  The primary-caretaker
rule counteracts, to an extent, the disadvantage to women built into
gender-neutral custody factors by giving custody to the parent who
actually cared for the child, in most instances the mother. This allows
women, who, along with their children, suffer devastating economic
consequences after divorce, 48 to trump men's economic advantage. 49
Justice Levine also has driven home the point that women earn less
income than men, period. She has attempted to introduce this reality
into determinations of spousal support and property division.5 0
A. CHILD CUSTODY
In Gravning v. Gravning,51 the majority upheld the trial court's
award of custody of the couple's son to the father, and the couple's
daughter to the mother.5 2 In so doing, the court expressly rejected the
primary-caretaker rule:
Some courts have made the "primary caretaker" factor into a
presumptive rule .... but in North Dakota the concept inheres
in the statutory factors and has not yet been accorded elevated
status. . . .In North Dakota, parents "have equal rights" as to
the "care, custody, education, and control of their minor
children. . . .Between the mother and father . . .there is no
remnant of the historic denial of women's rights."). Justice Levine's concurring opinion in Swenson,
incidentally, contains the one explicit reference to the dominance approach of which I am aware in
her opinions: a citation to a law journal article standing for the proposition that the "legal concept of
reasonable 'man' standard or gender-neutral standard does not work in sexual harassment cases
because it fails to recognize 'male dominance' within 'the larger phenomenon of gender hierarchy."'
Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 188 (quoting Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs.
Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LI. 35,53 (1990)).
46. See, e.g., Schneider v. Livingston, 543 N.W.2d 228, 230 (N.D. 1996) ("(T]he primary
caretaker rule has never gained a presumptive status in North Dakota ....").
47. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,712 (Minn. 1985). See generally Chambers, supra note 39,
at 527-41 (discussing the relevance of a parent's status as primary caretaker in custody decisions).
The court's decision in Pikula was penned by Justice Rosalie E. Wahl, the first woman on the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
48. E.g., LENORE J. WErTzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 337-56 (1985).
49. See Chambers, supra note 39, at 538-41; Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie That Binds:
Preference for the Primary Caretaker as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 482, 540-41 (1987).
50. But see Marcia O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D. L. REV. 225,
242 (1985) ("Rehabilitative support is ordinarily awarded for a limited amount of time because of a
reasonable expectation that further training, experience, and circumstances will enable the recipient
to obtain appropriate employment during that period.").
51. 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986).
52. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621,624 (N.D. 1986).
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presumption as to who will better promote the best interests and
welfare of the child."5 3
Justice Levine dissented on the basis that the mother had been the
primary caretaker of the children and thus should have received custody
of both children.54 While giving principal attention to the impact of
primary-caretaker custody on a child's best interests, 55 Justice Levine
implicitly recognized women's relatively weak bargaining position in
divorce negotiations:
[T]he primary caretaker rule will benefit the negotiation pro-
cess between divorcing parents. By virtue of the caretaking
function, the primary caretaker is likely to be closest to the
child, and thus generally will be substantially more distressed
by the loss of custody than the other parent. Consequently, be-
cause primary caretakers have the most at stake in custody dis-
putes, they are likely to make the most concessions regarding
alimony, support and property matters, especially when the
other parent uses the issue of custody as a coercive bargaining
weapon. The primary caretaker rule will strengthen and pro-
tect the primary caretaker's out-of-court bargaining position. 56
Though careful to stay within the bounds of existing law by stress-
ing the fact that "on its face, at least, the primary caretaker rule is gender
neutral," 57 Justice Levine nevertheless was mindful of the effect of the
rule on women.58 Justice Levine reiterated her inclination to adopt the
53. Id. at 622 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-06, 14-09-06.1) (citations omitted) (fourth
alteration in original).
54. Id. at 625.
55. Id. In Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 1989), Justice Levine quoted Professor
Marcia O'Kelly's psychological-bond rationale for the primary-caretaker rule:
Professor O'Kelly describes more persuasively and effectively than I can the rationale
for the presumption favoring the primary caretaker of young children and the impact of
the intimate interaction between young children and their primary caretaker:
"[Primaryl caregiving creates strong psychological bonding and that protection of
the psychological bond ... is more important than other relevant considerations in
identifying the parents in whose custody children 'will ... feel more loved or secure, or,
in the long term, be more competent and effective as adults."'
Id. at 500 (Levine, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Kelly, supra note 49, at 509 (quoting Chambers, supra
note 39, at 503)) (alterations in original).
56. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 625 (Levine, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
57. Id.; see also O'Kelly, supra note 49, at 540.
58. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 625 (Levine, J., dissenting). Professor O'Kelly agrees:
Even thfough it is not intended as a disguised. maternal preference, the impact of a
primary parent preference will certainly favor mothers. Given the gender-based role
division that continues to dominate American society, the primary caregiving parent is
more often female than male, whether or not she is employed outside her home.
O'Kelly, supra note 49, at 540. Nevertheless, Professor O'Kelly quickly disowned any suggestion of
female favoritism:
However, the justifications for a primary caretaker presumption are genuinely
gender-neutral. The desire for a clear rule to facilitate private bargaining masks no
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primary-caretaker rule in Kaloupek v. Burfening59 and Branson v.
Branson .60
Justice Levine wrote separately in Severson v. Hansen6l "to expose
the issue of gender bias and to suggest that much needs to be done to
educate and familiarize all judges and lawyers (and psychologists too, as
this case suggests) on the subject, so that when gender bias is present it
can be recognized and diffused." 62 Justice Levine examined the psy-
chological evaluations of the parents in a custody dispute. The father,
though exhibiting "considerable degrees of anger and resentment" and
"self-medicat[ing] .. .with cigarettes and alcohol," was simply "react-
ing normally to the stress" caused by the divorce and custody dispute. 63
The mother, on the other hand, exhibited "hysterical reactions" by
crying, raising her voice, and sharpening her tone, 64 and accordingly was
pronounced "paranoid" and "delusional." 65 Justice Levine took the
examining psychologist to task, pointing out that under a male standard,
"'typically male' emotions and responses are normal, while 'typically'
female emotions and responses are not." 66 Although a more subtle
application of the dominance approach, Justice Levine's refusal to gloss
over the blatant sexism of the psychologist's report illustrates, 67 to
paraphrase MacKinnon, that the male psyche defines psychology. 68
B. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Justice Levine appears to have been the Court's sole advocate of
taking into account the lesser earning capacities of women, as a subordi-
nate group, with regard to spousal support and property division. In
Volk v. Volk,69 Justice Levine took issue with the trial court's failure to
accord a wife's work in the home the same status as her husband's job.70
The trial court's finding that "nearly all of the property
acquired during the marriage came as a result of Pius' work
substantive bias of any kind. The need to avoid coercive misuse of the custody issue
against the primary caretaker is meant to protect the spouse who needs that protection
because of function rather than gender.
Id. MacKinnon, one presumes. would argue that gender is the defining indicator of vulnerability to
coercive tactics in divorce negotiations.
59. 440 N.W.2d 496, 500 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting).
60. 411 N.W.2d 395, 401 (N.D. 1987) (Levine, J., concurring and dissenting).
61. 529 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1995).
62. Severson v. Hansen, 529 N.W.2d 167, 170 (N.D. 1995) (Levine, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 171 (noting second psychologist's criticism of original pschological evaluation).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that females are institution-
alized "for behavior that is not punished, is even encouraged, in [males]").
69. 376 N.W.2d 16, 19 (N.D. 1985) (Levine, J., concurring and dissenting).
70. Volk v. Volk, 376 N.W.2d 16, 19 (N.D. 1985) (Levine, J., concurring and dissenting).
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effort" is likewise clearly erroneous. It is clear that in the
enterprise of marriage a traditional homemaker's contributions
arising from child care and home care constitute a valuable
contribution. . . . Here, Aleta not only cared for home and
children, she also held a fulltime job outside the home for
twenty-six years out of this twenty-eight year marriage .... If
a non-wage-earning homemaker's contribution is substantial, it
follows afortiori, that a wage-earning homemaker's contribu-
tions are substantial. Yet the trial court noted only that Pius
held down more than one job throughout most of the mar-
riage. It overlooks entirely that the same was true for Aleta.
The only difference between their respective extra jobs was
Pius' remuneration for his.71
Justice Levine took the opportunity presented by Beals v. Beals72 to
give trial courts a lesson in divorced women's reality:
In order to fairly consider the matter of spousal mainten-
ance, a trial court must understand, as a general proposition, the
economic realities of the marketplace as they affect those
women who have foregone training in favor of homemaking or
have absented themselves from the workplace and foregone
career advancement in favor of homemaking,. or have worked
at low-paying jobs to supplement the primary breadwinner's
income.
Generally, the economic consequences of divorce for
women are devastating. A wife's post-divorce income is about
half that of her former husband. Because, as a rule, women
have lower earning capacities, their net worth declines by 25%
within four years of divorce, while their former husbands'
improve. Within eight years after divorce a woman will often
have a negative net worth.73
Justice Levine went on to opine that these factors demonstrate the
potential necessity for permanent support. Importantly, Justice Levine
took into account the fact that women's work (meaning work-any
work-done by women) is valued less than that of men "as a rule."74
Wiege v. Wiege 75 presented a specific example of when temporary
rehabilitative support awarded to a woman may not serve its intended
purpose because of discriminatory, but nevertheless real, limitations on
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. 517 N.w.2d 413 (N.D. 1994).
73. Beals v. Beals, 517 N.W.2d 413,418 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. 518 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1994).
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women's earning capacities. 76 At the time of their divorce, the husband
earned $18.90 an hour working for a telephone cooperative, while the
wife earned $4.90 an hour at a retail store. 77 Both had high school
degrees. 78 Justice Levine noted that
Larry's earning capacity of four times more than Dianne's is
typical of the general disparity in earning capacities between
divorcing men and women. Temporary rehabilitative support
that enables a spouse like Dianne to obtain education or train-
ing is unlikely to achieve the parity necessary for Dianne to
maintain her prior standard of living or to bear no greater
reduction than Larry in her post-divorce standard of living. A
remedy for this permanent disparity in earning capacity and
the inequitable burdens the disparity breeds is permanent
support.79
Most recently, in Quamme v. Bellino,80 Justice Levine's brethren, in
their windowless courtroom, chose not to look at the social realities affect-
ing women. The case provides an impeccable example of neutral prin-
ciples in action. Bellino, the wife, argued that the North Dakota Supreme
Court had "hinted that special considerations must be given to awarding
spousal support where the spouse that has been disadvantaged by the
marriage is a woman."8 1 Characterizing Bellino's argument as a "call
for gender biased treatment," the Court rejected it out of hand:
Bellino offered no evidence she would be disadvantaged by her
gender in her chosen profession .. . .Legal principles based
on stereotyped assumptions are unworthy of our judicial
system, and participants in our justice system are entitled to be
free from such categorizing. Stereotyping leads to bias and
prejudice; it doesn't correct it.82
Justice Levine, while concurring, refused to confuse stereotype with
reality, stating, "[i]t is not a 'stereotyped assumption' that women are
more likely to be .economically disadvantaged by divorce than men: It
is a plain fact, which has been established in study after study." 83
Quoting Lenore Weitzman's "famous figure" 84 that "divorced men
experience an average 43 percent rise in their standard of living in the
76. Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 711-12 (N.D. 1994).
77. Id. at 710.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 713 (Levine, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
80. 540 N.W.2d 142 (N.D. 1995).
81. Quamme v. Bellino, 540 N.W.2d 142,147 (N.D. 1995).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 148 (Levine, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
84. Williams, supra note 38, at 2228 n.i.
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first year after the divorce, while divorced women (and their children)
experience a 73 percent decline," 85 Justice Levine concluded,
[I]t is not biased to recognize that women are more likely to
fall into the category of "disadvantaged spouse" and that
homemakers are more likely to encounter an inhospitable job
market. The reality of gender-based bias, discrimination and
detriment is not pretty, and we cannot make it go away merely
by calling it a "stereotyped assumption" and closing our eyes
to it under the guise of "blind justice." 86
As the above excerpts illustrate, Justice Levine's opinions take into
account the reality of gender inequality. In this way, her opinions follow
the dominance approach to sex inequality. Particularly in the areas of
child custody and spousal support, Justice Levine has been a lone voice
in relaying women's experience of "poverty, financial dependency,
[and] motherhood." 87 Her statements cast doubt on the ostensible
gender neutrality of the rules enacted by the North Dakota legislature
and enunciated by the Court, revealing their bias against women and
their role in maintaining the status quo. Though obviously aware of the
limitations placed on her by existing law, Justice Levine nevertheless
injected women's reality where she could.
IV. CONCLUSION
When Justice Levine joined the Court, she had, as the first woman,
an implicit choice. She could see her position as proof that sex discrimi-
nation does not exist, 88 or she could use her position as a vehicle for
eradicating sex discrimination and pursuing sex equality. To her credit,
her opinions reflect an awareness of women's reality outside the court-
room-no matter to what extent Justice Levine personally experienced
that reality. Despite her own successes, which are many, Justice Levine
never forgot that many women-most women-fail (to some degree)
rather than succeed in the face of gender inequality.
85. Quamme, 540 N.W.2d at 148-49 (Levine, J., concurring) (quoting WErZMAN, supra note 48,
at 323).
86. Id. at 149.
87. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 73.
88. "When a few of us, the exceptions, overcome all this, we are told we prove that there are no
barriers there and are used as examples to put other women down. She made it, why can't you?" Id.
at 76. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas is a convenient subject of this criticism. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (calling affirmative action programs "racial discrimination, plain and
simple"); Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 123
(1993) ("Leaders of the Black community, in particular, were disturbed by [Thomas's] record on civil
rights and by the level of concern he had shown for the poor and disadvantaged.").
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[T]o those who say, "Any woman can," as if there were no
such thing as discrimination, as if that were exceptional, I say
this, and I say it as a woman: all women can't. And that will
be true so long as those who do make it are the privileged few.
Until all women can, none of us succeed as women, but as
exceptions. When we fail, we fail with 53 percent of the
population; when we succeed, we succeed alone.
89
This, perhaps, was her greatest challenge as a judge: to remember
that women's successes should serve as a model of women's potential in
an ideal world of sex equality, rather than proof that sex discrimination
does not exist. One hopes that Justice Levine's opinions will remind
those who follow her of the same.
During an address given in honor of Minnesota Supreme Court
Justices Rosalie Wahl and M. Jeanne Coyne,90 MacKinnon asked, "[W]ill
they use the tools of law as women, for all women?" 9 1 With regard to
Justice Levine and her tenure on the North Dakota Supreme Court, the
answer is yes.
89. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 76-77.
90. Justice Coyne, when asked whether women judges decide cases differently by virtue of being
women, answered that "a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the same conclusion." Although
female- biology is not a prerequisite to comprehending the dominance approach (just ask Jeffrey
Masson), the approach itself was borne of women's experience. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg has noted in
response to Justice Coyne's remark, "[W]omen, like persons of different racial groups and ethnic
origins, contribute what . . . [has been] described as 'a distinctive medley of views influenced by
differences in biology, cultural impact, and life experience."' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Progression
of Women in the Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1994) (quoting Judge Alvin Rubin). Thus,
although not determinative, the coincidence of Justice Levine's gender and opinions (in the broad
sense of the term) is no accident.
91. MACKINNON, FEImNIsM UNMODIFTED, supra note 6. at 77.
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